Side channel attacks exploit implementation-specic information leakage to defeat cryptographic
measures, usually designed to provide condentiality. The majority of published attacks require
physical possession or network access to the target device, and as such are not suitable for
implementation by an attacker wishing to carry out a remote, passive and undetectable attack.
Surveillance techniques can be applied to compromising emanations, which is eectively side
channel leakage from devices handling the sensitive, and protected, information desired by the
attacker. By monitoring compromising emanations from devices processing data in plaintext,
such as computer monitors and keyboards, an attacker can completely bypass the protection
oered by cryptographic primitives. Published work on these emanations focusses on three
main sources; electromagnetic radiation, visual representations of the data, and acoustic signals.
This project aims to review the literature on techniques exploiting these emanations, and place
them in the context of real world attacks, potentially undertaken by a variety of individuals
and organisations. Current and future technological developments of sensors and consumer
electronics will also be discussed in relation to their applicability to these attacks, identifying
possible directions in which they might develop in the future.